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Abstract 
 
This article explores how the sometimes hidden power of cultural context, in Afghanistan 
and in the practice of OD, impacted the change consulting process.  Since the original 
publication of this article, more cross-cultural models have been developed and the 
dialogue about how to adapt OD methodologies across cultures has become more 
prominent.  OD continues to be in a unique position to succeed in complex, cross-cultural 
environments due to two of its key elements: use of self and action research.  Embodying 
them enables crucial skills, indispensable when consulting within challenging 
environments.   
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After working in two separate public sector OD projects in Afghanistan, funded by 
USAID (US Agency for International Development) and UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme), in 2007 and 2008, and spending a combined total of 5 months 
in that country, I gained an appreciation for the potential of OD in such a challenging 
environment, despite its cultural biases.  In an earlier article (2008) I looked at the world of 
international development in Afghanistan through an OD lens.  I also explored how having 
an OD orientation – embodying the essence of the discipline – was key to having a positive 
impact in a complex environment where some OD tools won’t work.   Now, I will explore 
how the sometimes hidden power of cultural context, in Afghanistan and in the practice of 
OD, impacted the change consulting process, especially when the underlying values 
contrasted.  This exploration is particularly relevant to the profession of OD, which is 
increasingly applied in contexts beyond the culture of its founders.  It is also relevant for 
those who seek change in environments different from the promoters of change.  The twin 
blinders of pre-conceived notions about a client and lack of self-awareness interfere with a 
consultant’s ability to perceive and navigate effectively in human systems.  The former 
derives from ignorance about a client’s environment and mindset, the latter from ignorance 
about one’s own filters.  Ignorance or lack of skill in surfacing these blinders on the part of 
the consultant inevitably reinforces resistance to change. i   For this reason, OD, despite its 
cultural bias, is in a unique position to add value in complex, cross-cultural environments 
with its emphasis on two key elements of an OD orientation: use of self and action research.   
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Both methodologies help mitigate the damage of the twin blinders and enable greater skill 
when consulting within a challenging environment. 
In this article, I will start with a brief background of the players and the domains of 
the projects.  The main body of the article then contrasts the Afghan national culture (which 
I will call ANC) as captured by Entezar (2007) who used Hofstede's (1980, 2001, 2005) 
original four dimension model of cultureii to try to explain deep values of Afghans, beyond 
behaviors, to foreigners hoping to work successfully in the country. iii   I will contrast 
Entezar's ANC values with Jaeger's (1986) values of OD and will show how each of the 
four dimensions affected the consulting process.   Then I will discuss why two key elements 
of an OD orientation were important to our work: use of self, which enabled self-awareness, 
and action research, which was key in increasing our awareness of the client system.  I will 
conclude with a discussion of the implications for the field of OD. 
Background 
My colleague and I are white, female Americans privileged to hold advanced 
degrees.  We subcontracted to different consulting firms operating in Afghanistan during 
the two projects who employed both Afghans of various tribes and foreigners from a variety 
of countries. There was a mix of men and women in the firms.  Our clients in the Afghan 
government, amongst different organizations in both the central government and several 
provincial governments, were mostly men, from a mixture of tribes, and typically well 
established in terms of tenure in the government.  We used an adapted version of action 
research heavily balanced with diplomacy. 
Expectations about Equality 
Entezar, a cross-cultural trainer, used interviews, stories, observation and other 
forms of data collection, to determine how Hofstede's model of culture applied to the 
national culture of Afghanistan.  He used the same four original dimensions as Hosftede to 
isolate patterns of values.  The first dimension, Power Distance (PD), is "defined as the 
extent to which the less powerful members...within a country expect and accept that power 
is distributed unequally" (2005, p. 46).   Entezar suggests that the ANC has high power 
distance, meaning that most Afghans expect there to be inequality in society, whether 
between parents and children, between men and women, or between those in power and 
those with less.  In contrast, Jaeger proposes that OD as a profession values smaller power 
distance, meaning OD practitioners promote greater equalityiv.   In our work, this contrast 
of values presented a huge gap in expectations on a systems level, as well as on a practical 
level. (Table 1)  
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Table 1. 
Power Distance in the Afghan National Culture  
 
Power Distance (PD) 
Low – OD 
 
Inequality should be minimized 
 
 
Decision-making participative  
 
Social power is persuasive 
High – ANC 
 
Inequality/ 
hierarchy should be preserved 
 
Decision-making autocratic 
 
Social power is coercive 
On a systems level, we represented the occupying force in a nation at war. The 
invasion of Afghanistan by the US-led coalition forces in late 2001, the subsequent 
overwhelming presence of US and international armed forces as well as foreign aid workers 
created a dynamic which placed us higher in the hierarchy of influence than we might have 
experienced in a different system, or in a different time in this system, and gave us 
additional leverage (and of course invited understandable resistance).   
On a practical level, we had to make sure we had the expressed sponsorship of 
senior players in order to be able to deal with people lower in the system (typical of most 
OD practitioners operating in a formal hierarchy).  Often, this meant weeks of introductions 
through credible people.  Our introductions were sometimes blocked by individuals wary 
of our presence and approach, so persistence was key. 
In addition, we made sure we isolated levels of hierarchy in our series of data 
collection meetings to promote a safe space for discussion, since individuals rarely 
countered their superiors publicly.  We did attempt to encourage participation (low PD) 
within these isolated groups, though typically one or two dominant players (high PD) 
usually made the decisions for the group. 
One thing we learned early on was that using our personal power was critical.   
Cultures high in power distance tend to place more emphasis on personal rather than 
institutional control.  We needed to convey strength, clarity and be willing to balance 
respect with assertiveness in order to earn credibility.  Entezar (2007) notes that for 
Afghans, the authority of the person, rather than the authority of the rule determines social 
weight.  We gained little from trying to persuade clients of the value of our approach, but 
were able to gain more from how we conducted ourselves.  We were also challenged to 
adapt to an environment where assertiveness and intimidation are used to establish personal 
power. Though we took pains to be respectful of the culture and individuals, we were 
sometimes openly confronted, which we met by standing our ground, sometimes “toning” 
(a concept from the military of raising one’s voice to convey strength and importance).   
With such emphasis on personal power, institutions have not been historically 
strong in Afghanistan (Azoy, 2003, p.27) Azoy further notes that “the Afghan form of 
authority resides neither in permanent corporations nor in formal statuses, but in individual  
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men who relate to each other in transient patterns of cooperation and competition" (2003, 
p. 24).  Since authority is considered impermanent and insecure, our focus was much more 
on assessing and strategizing current relationships rather than the current state of the 
system.   Job descriptions and organizational charts (often drawn up by outsiders) did little 
to illuminate the situation.  Instead, we had to strategize intensely around the covert 
processes and navigate daily with little roadmap.   
Anxiety about the Unknown 
The second domain of Hofstede’s model is Uncertainty Avoidance (UA), which he 
defines as “the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or 
unknown situations” (2005, p. 167) Cultures that have strong uncertainty avoidance tend 
to have clear and strongly reinforced rules about what is acceptable in order to manage the 
anxiety of uncertainty.  In the case of Afghanistan, according to Entezar (2007), people feel 
that chance plays a bigger role in what happens than choice.   Afghans tend to embrace a 
fatalist orientation - life generally is out of control (some Afghans, in response, use the 
Arabic phrase “in sh’allah”, or “God-willing” when someone expresses a wish for the 
future).  In fact, it could be said that they view the confidence we have in the West about 
controlling our environment as hubris.  Therefore, there is a tendency in Afghanistan to 
focus on the present, rather than the future.  
 In contrast, Jaeger (1986) observes that OD is weak in uncertainty avoidance.  The 
profession of OD was founded in a more stable environment, one filled with post-World 
War II hope, enabling a future orientation.  OD practitioners promote planning and choice 
within this assumption of stability.  This inevitably led to a challenge in our work to even 
have a discussion about future possibilities. Many in our client systems knew well that 
focusing on moment-to-moment tactics was safer and more personally rewarding than 
railing against uncontrollable forces. 
 
Table 2. 
Uncertainty Avoidance in the Afghan National Culture  
 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) 
Weak - OD 
 
Less stress is experienced 
 
Aggressive behavior frowned 
upon 
 
Future orientation possible 
 
Strong - ANC 
 
Uncertainty felt as a continuous threat 
 
Aggressive behavior accepted 
 
 
Present orientation common 
 
An interesting reaction to this dynamic environment, both on the part of clients and 
on the part of other development consultants, was a strong emphasis on details, such as  
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those that end up in reports to donors.  Typically, in an OD engagement, the consultant will 
at some point draw their client into a conversation of the big picture - either the future, or 
the current state, but from a broader, "higher altitude" place where one might seek 
perspective and inspiration.  However, in such an unstable environment, details provided a 
safe zone where action could be taken without the volatility of ideas.  A perhaps unintended 
consequence of this orientation was that the desired future state became the shadow, 
meaning that it was either unacknowledged by the client, who knew that no one could 
predict, nor plan for, the future in such an environment, or overemphasized to the point of 
unattainable fantasy on the part of development consultants, and in any case hard to 
manage.v As a result, any improvement or change tended to be unacknowledged, as it could 
not possibly meet such high expectations.  In terms of responding to this dynamic, we chose 
not to get bogged down in details, which had the potential of undermining more valuable 
conversations, and furthermore, we earned credibility with our clients when we promised 
not to take data and merely submit a report to them or the donors.  Instead, we continued 
to promote the idea that what we wanted to help them with was hopefully practical and 
useful, even if perhaps aspirational.   We also found that focusing on the tangible, without 
getting lost in details, led to greater impact and trust with the client, and offered a means to 
bridge the enormous cultural gap. (Table 2)  
Another element of ANC culture related to UA is an emphasis on experts, since 
experts are in a position to identify what is right and wrong, something valued in a strong 
UA culture.  Entezar  (2007, p. 54) notes that many heads of ministries have advanced 
degrees in the government (though not necessarily in management).  OD, reflecting its 
comfort with the unknown, however, values process over expertise.  Thus, although we 
were granted status by our advanced degrees, there was an expectation from our clients that 
we would tell them what to do.  However, consultants that had previously told clients what 
to do did not fare well.  We interpreted this paradox to mean that although there might have 
been a cultural expectation to deliver expertise, it ended up being unacceptable to the client 
since expert advice rarely acknowledged the values and realities of the client system.  
Consequently, the gap between their expectation and what we delivered led to some 
confusion.  The same gap also existed with some of the donors to the project, who were 
accustomed to seeing the design and delivery of expert consultation and thus had some 
difficulty appreciating our approach.  This meant that we had to expend effort both 
acknowledging this difference, and protecting the consulting process through dialogue, 
education and debriefs. 
The Individual and the Collective 
In Hofstede’s third dimension, Individualism/Collectivism, (IND), he explores the 
contrasts between individualist cultures and collectivist cultures.  In individualist cultures,  
“the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself 
and his or her immediate family….(at the other end of the spectrum) 
Collectivism…(describes cultures) in which people from birth onward are integrated into 
strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetimes continue to protect them 
in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (2005, p. 76).  Entezar (2007) places the ANC at 
the collectivist end of the spectrum, meaning that relationships, especially tribal loyalties, 
have clear value over task, and Jaeger (1986) places OD in the middle of the spectrum, 
valuing task, but promoting the attainment of task through effective relationship. (Table 3) 
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As mentioned in my earlier article (2008), building relationships was key to having 
any kind of trust or influence.  Active listening, reflecting medium IND values, is typically 
used in OD to enable the practitioner to promote the achievement of a task by building trust 
with the client.  By using active listening, we were able to learn, elicit client confidence 
regarding our intentions, and earn the right to push back when appropriate. 
 
  Table 3. 
   Individualism in the Afghan National Culture 
 
Individualism (IND) 
Medium Individualist - OD  
 
Task and relationships important 
 
Individual differences valued 
 
Systems-thinking valued (but not at the expense of 
the individual) 
 
Expertise and performance a form of social 
currency 
Collectivist - ANC 
 
Relationships over task 
 
Tribal identity valued 
 
Reputation a form of social currency 
In a collectivist culture, reputation is one of the few sources of social capital beyond 
tribal and familial relationships. We were helped by the fact that we subcontracted to a firm 
with a strong reputation for being a serious player.   We were given status and respect 
merely for being associated with highly skillful colleagues in an organization known for 
delivering what it promised.  It also helped when we complemented the work of a mature, 
multi-year project.  Clients in the government had had the opportunity to get to know 
players in the project, had engaged in many dialogues over time about what approach best 
suited the situation, and had benefitted from success across multiple domains of the project. 
However, we were under pressure from the beginning of our project to maintain the good 
reputation due to the dynamic shifting of power relationships mentioned earlier. 
Related to IND is the observation that Afghanistan is a society that values the oral 
tradition and verbal communication over the written word.  On the surface, this meant that 
putting things in writing had less weight than it does in the West, and that taking a literal 
and legalistic perspective, as do many development consultants, bought little influence and 
could actually backfire.  As a result, our contracting with our clients was entirely verbal. 
On a more subtle level, this meant that stories mattered, and that listening to stories 
mattered quite a bit in terms of showing clients respect and understanding their worldview 
better. 
Masculine and Feminine 
The fourth dimension of Hofstede’s model is masculinity (MAS).  Hofstede 
observes that “a (culture) is called masculine when emotional gender roles are clearly 
distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough and focused on material success, whereas  
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women are supposed to be more modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life.  A 
(culture) is called feminine when emotional gender roles overlap: both men and women are 
supposed to be modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life.”  (2005, p. 120).   
Entezar (2007) observes that the ANC is a high masculinity culture, where the roles 
between men and women are very distinct and clearly defined in traditional terms.  Jaeger 
(1986) suggests that OD is a low masculinity culture, promoting less distinction between 
gender roles and greater equality between the sexes. 
 
Table 4. 
Masculinity in the Afghan National Culture 
 
Masculinity (MAS) 
Low - OD 
 
Equality and non-differentiation 
between genders 
 
Nurturing linked to high performance 
 
Public expression of vulnerability 
valued 
 
High - ANC 
 
Traditional gender roles reinforced 
 
 
Nurturing a role for women 
 
Public expression of vulnerability a liability 
Afghanistan is a male-dominated society (positions of power and leadership are 
held almost exclusively by men) where women on the whole are asked by society to stay 
indoors, hidden from the public, raising children and serving their families.  The majority 
of Afghan women who want to be considered respectable, and avoid harassment, must be 
accompanied by a man in public, and must remain covered by a chadar (head covering) at 
least, though many still wear a burkha (covering them from head to toe).  In 
acknowledgement of and respect to this high MAS environment, my colleague and I always 
covered our heads, dressed conservatively and, when walking in public, were conscious of 
dropping our eyes to the ground and pulling in our energy so as to not draw too much 
attention (though we did anyway when not accompanied by men).  In meetings with clients, 
however, we balanced the respect for the high MAS culture we were in with our own low 
MAS values, using direct eye contact and a confident presence, which we were at some 
liberty to do as foreigners.  We acted in this way because we not only sought respect as 
individuals, but wanted respect paid to our consulting process.  Although many of our 
clients in the government had been exposed to foreigners, our identity as females created 
both a helpful and a hindering dynamic.   On the one hand, our presence appeared to unsettle 
some clients, throwing off the usual patterns of comfort that exist in interactions among 
men.   Not too many Afghan men had experience dealing with women in roles of power. 
On the other hand, some clients seemed to be open to us, and were unusually gracious and 
hospitable - in an almost protective way.  It might be said that they were more willing to 
talk with us because we were not perceived as threatening to them as other men might be.   
 
 
 ABAC ODI JOURNAL   VISION. ACTION. OUTCOME. 
VOLUME 2    ISSUE 1       JANUARY - JUNE   2015    
 
72 
 
 
http://www.odijournal.au.edu/ 
OD Orientation:   Use of Self and Action Research 
I have discussed the differences between the national culture of Afghanistan and 
the culture of OD through Hofstede’s lens and how it affected our consulting process.  The 
following presents why I believe use of self and action research, key elements of an OD 
orientation, were essential methodologies in enabling us to have some productive impact 
in our project work that was respectful of our client’s environment.  
Use of self is a practice of consciously raising awareness of one’s own filters, one’s 
point of view and one’s assumptions, then using such awareness to further the process of 
mutual learning in a client system.  We would not have been able to navigate in an 
environment like Afghanistan without this practice. On the one hand, the practice of use of 
self- enabled us to be aware of the biases we brought about the use of OD, per Jaeger’s 
(1986) observations, as well as our general worldview.  (We did not, however, use much 
self-disclosure with clients in this political environment - formality and diplomacy worked 
more effectively in bridging deep cultural divides.)  On the other hand, while we had to 
adapt, we could not lose ourselves in the process.  There was much in the environment that 
challenged our sense of ourselves, so without a daily practice of reflection and debriefing, 
we might have been lost.  Use of self- enabled us to get a handle on our feelings and 
concerns and manage them in a way that took care of ourselves while serving the client 
well. 
In terms of helping us be open to learning about the client environment, action 
research (the repeated cycles of contracting, data collection, diagnosis, feedback, and 
action) was invaluable as a methodology.  Action research is to a complex client system 
what snow shoes are to deep snow – it allows a lightness of step so that one can keep 
moving.  The action research process assumes ignorance regarding the client environment, 
and uses all data to move from ignorance to awareness.  Even more powerful, the client, 
who also learns what assumptions are at work in their system, ideally mirrors the 
consultant’s own journey. Awareness, and ideally, consensual clarity around the underlying 
assumptions in the client system, may arguably be the single most powerful outcome a 
client will get from the OD consulting process.  Also, by raising assumptions, consultant 
and client are in a better position to bridge the gaps in their worldviews.   Expert consulting, 
which is predominant in the international development world, assumes too much and is 
often unaware of its biases to be of broad use in a complex, cross-cultural human system 
dynamic.  We found that an adapted version of action research did indeed work in 
Afghanistan.  We adapted the process to spend much more time up front identifying the 
client.  In a political system, and especially one with the additional layers of foreign donors 
involved, the client was not as easily defined as it would be in a more transparent, bottom-
line organization. We also spent much more energy contracting and re-contracting, though 
much of what was understood by us and our clients to be the nature of our consulting 
relationship remained covert despite our efforts to make it more explicit and negotiated.  
We also proceeded more carefully and diplomatically with regards to surfacing issues than 
we might in a US, bottom-line organization or in an environment in peacetime.  Action 
research was effective at raising issues, focusing the attention of the organization, building 
momentum and unearthing obstacles to change, though it was not always safe to pursue the 
nature of the obstacles. Use of action research led in one case to unprecedented discussions 
in one system about mission and vision.  Our process was rarely linear nor predictable and 
thus benefitted from the iterative nature of action research.  
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Summary and Implications for OD 
In our OD consulting work in Afghanistan it was vital to learn about what was 
unique about our client environment as well as to consciously be aware of our own 
worldview.  Many of the values of OD were in complete contrast with the national culture 
of Afghanistan, so we had to adapt our approach.  However, that which is essential to an 
OD orientation, use of self and action research, enabled us to bridge the very gap we 
presented with our presence. 
What potential does OD have in the world of international development?  In a world 
of answers, OD is at ease with questions.  In a world of consultant-centered solutions, OD 
provides the methodology to elicit client-centered solutions.  In a world of well-meaning 
consultants who are equipped only to handle the relatively well-controlled environment of 
business, OD consultants are trained to deal with the chaos of human interaction.  The 
application of an adapted form of OD is a powerful alternative to the existing approaches 
towards change in the developing world. 
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The discussion of the larger context of why the US and its coalition are in Afghanistan and whether we should be promoting change is 
not addressed in this article. 
 Hofstede later added a fifth dimension, “short- and long-term orientation” (now called Pragmatic vs. Normative) which Entezar felt 
less relevant to Afghanistan; Hofstede’s sixth dimension, Indulgence vs. Restraint, is not addressed. 
 Entezar emphasizes that one must generalize to describe a culture as ethnically diverse as the one found in Afghanistan, which is home 
to a number of tribes including Pashtun, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaqs, Baluchies, Turkmen, Nuristanis and others. 
 As in OD, low PD is reflected in the larger rhetoric surrounding the US occupation of and aid to Afghanistan which encouraged 
democracy  
 In fact, there is a dynamic I call the "blank slate" mentality that originates in the US - based on the fantasy that early Americans created 
a powerful country out of nothing - a new world with new promises and possibilities out of a virgin Eden, ignoring a history of genocide, 
slavery and oppression.  The myth of endemic perfection persists in our attempts to "make-over" other countries in an idealized image 
of what we, ourselves, are not even able to achieve.  
                                                 
